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Abstract
Aiming at a ternary quantum logic circuit, four symmetric ternary quantum ho-
momorphic encryption schemes, based on ternary quantum one-time protocol, were
presented. First, for a one-qutrit rotation gate, a homomorphic quantum encryption
scheme was constructed. Second, in view of the synthesis of a general 3 × 3 unitary
transformation, another one-qutrit quantum homomorphic encryption scheme was pro-
posed. Third, according to the one-qutrit scheme, the two-qutrit quantum homomorphic
encryption scheme about GCX(m’)gate was constructed and was further generalized to
the n-qutrit unitary matrix case. Finally, the security of these schemes was analyzed
from two perspectives. It could be concluded that the attacker can correctly guess the
encryption key with a maximum probability pk = 1
/
33n, thus it can better protect
the privacy of users data. Moreover these schemes can be well integrated into future
quantum remote server architecture, and the computational security of the users private
quantum information can be well solved in a distributed computing environment.
1 Introduction
In a distributed computing environment, customers have a large amount of data stored
in the remote server. These data may include personal bank account information, online
shopping records, credit card consumption records, etc., and this information belongs to
customers private encrypted data which is indistinguishable for a remote server. Suppose
we intend to compute on the encrypted data without a decryption process, or delegate it
to a trusted third party without leaking information of the input data: is it possible to do
so? Fortunately, blind computation[1] or homomorphic encryption[2, 3, 4, 5] can achieve
it perfectly without a decryption process and leaking private information of the encrypted
input data.
From the perspective of quantum information processing, performing operations on en-
crypted data without a decryption process is relative to blind quantum computation[6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11]and quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE). This paper will study this prob-
lem by the QHE technique that can not only protect the privacy of users data, but also
accomplish secure computatiom on a remote server.
Rohde et al.[12] firstly studied quantum walks with encrypted data, and then they
proposed a limited QHE scheme using the Boson sampling and multi-walker quantum walk
models on Linear Optics Quantum Computation. However, QHE has still not been defined,
and a quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE) scheme has not yet been constructed.
Liang[13] firstly presented the definitions of the QHE and QFHE, and then, based on
the Quantum One-Time Pad (QOTP) protocol, he constructed the symmetric QHE and
QFHE scheme with perfect security, where evaluation function depends on the encryption
keys. Subsequently, learning from the Universal Quantum Circuit (UQC), he proposed a
QFHE scheme[14]. In the scheme, the encryption key is different from the decryption key,
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and cannot be public. Moreover, evaluation algorithm is independent of the encryption key,
and the decryption key can be computed from the encryption key by an interactive update
process. Recently, Liang[15] again presented two QFHE schemes, which are constructed
based on quantum fault-tolerant construction. The characteristics are using quantum CSS
code as the secret key and containing the periodical interaction between Client and Server.
Armknecht et al.[16] proved the general impossibility of (Abelian) group homomorphic
encryption in the presence of quantum adversaries, when assuming the IND-CPA security
notion as the minimal security requirement. And they provided a sufficient condition and
discussed its satisfiability in non-group homomorphic cases. Tan et al.[17] presented a
private-key QHE scheme that hides arbitrary quantum computations. A particular instance
of their encoding hides information at least proportional to m logm bits when m bits are
encrypted. Recently, Broadbent et al.[18] presented QHE schemes for circuits of low T-
gate complexity. These schemes allow for arbitrary Clifford group gates, but they become
inefficient for circuits with a large degree of complexity, measured in terms of the non-Clifford
portion of the circuit.
Currently, QHE research is limited and mainly focused on the quantum bits (qubits).
According to present research, this article presented four Ternary QHE (TQHE) schemes
based on the Ternary QOTP (TQOTP) for the first time. The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction to ternary quantum gates and QHE, and
a TQOTP scheme is presented. In section 3, the first TQHE scheme, based on one-qutrit
rotation gatesR
(ij)
∂ (θ), is constructed, and it is generalized to a general ternary quantum
gate with synthesis idea. Then the third TQHE scheme about a GCX gate is constructed,
and extended to n-qutrit gate in theory. These schemes are analyzed by synthesizing con-
cepts from ternary quantum gates, secret key security and user data privacy in section 4.
Conclusions and future research ideas are presented in section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Universal Quantum Circuits
Definition 1. (Universal Quantum Circuit (UQC)[19]) Fix n > 0 and let C be a collection
of quantum circuits on n qubits. A quantum circuit U on (n + m) qubits is universal for
C if, for every circuit CU ∈ C, there is a string x ∈ {0, 1}m(the encoding) such that, for all
strings,y ∈ {0, 1}n (the data),
U(|y〉 ⊗ |x〉) = CU (|y〉)⊗ |x〉 (2.1)
The definition of the UQC tells us two things: one is that an arbitrary U transformation
can be synthesized by a finite number of logic gates of the C set. Another is that blind
quantum computation or homomorphic encryption scheme can be constructed, which will
be discussed later. In the UQC, given a n-qubit |y〉 as the input data, while a m-qubit
|x〉 is input as the encoding of a quantum transformation CU ∈ C, the UQC would output
(n + m) qubits (shown in Eq.2.1). Here,n-qubit |x〉 is called the encoding of the quantum
transformation CU ∈ C with regard to the UQC C. |x〉 as input data can not only hide
the data |y〉 but also protect the operation CU . Furthermore, Eq.2.1 gives a transformation
between U and CU quantum circuit, which means it is possible to construct a homomorphism
operator between U and CU .
2.2 Ternary Quantum Circuit
A qutrit is represented as a unit vector in state space, which is a complex three-dimensional
vector space H3. In the computational basis, the basis vectors (or basis states) of H3 are
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written in Dirac notation as |0〉 , |1〉, and |2〉, where |0〉 ≡ (1, 0, 0)T , |1〉 ≡ (0, 1, 0)T , and
|2〉 ≡ (0, 0, 1)T . An arbitrary vector |ϕ〉 in H3 can be expressed as a linear combination
|ϕ〉 = a0 |0〉+ a1 |1〉+ a2 |2〉, where ai ∈ C and
∑2
i=0 |ai|2 = 1. The real number |ai|2 is the
probability that the state vector will be in the ith basis state upon measurement.
A qudit is represented as a unit vector in the state space, which is a complex projective
d dimensional Hilbert space Hd. In the computational basis, the basis vectors of Hd are
written in Dirac notation as |0〉 , |1〉 , · · ·, |d− 1〉, where |i〉 =(0, 0, ..., 1, ..., 0)T with a 1 in
the (i+1)st coordinate, for 0 ≤ i ≤ d − 1. Its linear combination is similar with that of
the qutrit. Note that the basis vectors in the computational basis are ordered by natural
numbers.
2.2.1 Common one-qutrit circuits
1)Ternary X(ij) (TX) gates
The operators X(ij) are defined as follows,
X(ij) = |i〉 〈j|+ |j〉 〈i|+
∑
k 6=i,j |k〉 〈k| , i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2} (2.2)
The X(ij) gates acting on |k〉 can be represented as X(ij) |k〉 =

|j〉 , k = i
|i〉 , k = j
|k〉 , others
. Because
X(ij) = X(ji) and X(ij)i=j = I3,TX gates have three valid forms and are defined as follows:
X(0) ≡ X(01), X(1) ≡ X(02), and X(2) ≡ X(12) (2.3)
2)Ternary H(ij) gates
The ternary extension of Hadamard gate can be expressed as
H(0) ≡ H(01) = 1/√2
 1 1 01 −1 0
0 0
√
2
 , H(1) ≡ H(02) = 1/√2
 1 0 10 √2 0
1 0 −1
 ,
H(2) ≡ H(12) = 1/√2
 √2 0 00 1 1
0 1 −1
 .
(2.4)
The H(ij) gates acting on |k〉 can be expressed as
H(ij) |k〉 =

1
/√
2(|i〉+ |j〉), k = i
1
/√
2(|i〉 − |j〉), k = j
|k〉 , k 6= i, j
(2.5)
3)Ternary Z(i) gates
The Z(i) gates can be denoted as follows,
Z(0) ≡ diag{−1, I2}, Z(1) ≡ diag{1,−1, 1}, Z(2) ≡ diag{I2,−1} (2.6)
The Zij gates applied to |k〉 can be expressed as Z(i) |k〉 =
{ − |k〉 , i = k
|k〉 , i 6= k .
4)Ternary shift gates
The ternary shift gates are listed in Table 1, in which the addition is mode 3 addition.
5)Ternary rotation gates
The definition of a one-qutrit rotation gate is listed in Eq.2.7.
R
(ij)
∂ (θ) = exp(−iσ(ij)∂ θ/2) (2.7)
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Table 1: Ternary shift gates.
Name Operation Equivalent to X operations
Buffer f(x) = x I3
Single-shift f(x) = x+ 1 X01X12
Dual-shift f(x) = x+ 2 X12X01
Self-shift f(x) = 2x X12
Self-Single-shift f(x) = 2x+ 1 X01
Self-Dual-shift f(x) = 2x+ 2 X02
where ∂ ∈ {x, y, z}, 0 ≤ i < j ≤ 2, σ(ij)x = |i〉 〈j| + |j〉 〈i|, σ(ij)y = −i |i〉 〈j| + i |j〉 〈i|,
σ
(ij)
z = |i〉 〈i| − |j〉 〈j|. Based on exponent mapping[20], the following four equations are
obvious,R
(01)
y (θ) =
 cos(θ/2) − sin(θ/2) 0sin(θ/2) cos(θ/2) 0
0 0 1
 , R(02)y (θ) =
 cos(θ/2) 0 − sin(θ/2)0 1 0
sin(θ/2) 0 cos(θ/2)
,
R
(01)
z (θ) =
 e−iθ/2 0 00 eiθ/2 0
0 0 1
 and R(02)z (θ) =
 eiθ/2 0 00 1 0
0 0 e−iθ/2
.
A one-qutrit gate is essentially a 3× 3 unitary matrix. According to the Cartan Decom-
position of Lie algebra, the unitary matrix U has the following form[21],
U1 = e
iαR
(01)
y (β)R
(02)
y (γ)R
(01)
y (δ)R
(01)
z (θ),
U2 = R
(02)
z (ϕ)R
(01)
y (β′)R
(02)
y (γ′)R
(01)
y (δ′),
U = U1 × U2.
(2.8)
where α, β, γ, δ, θ, ϕ, β′, γ′ and δ′ are all real numbers. The four basic one-qutrit rotation
gates, R
(01)
y (β), R
(02)
y (γ), R
(01)
z (θ), and R
(02)
z (ϕ), constitute a set of one-qutrit elementary
gates[20].
2.2.2 Common two-qutrit circuits
1)Ternary NOT gate
A Ternary NOT gate Nj(Ai) is defined as Pj = Ai⊕31, if j = i; else Pj = Ai, where ⊕3
stands for addition modulo 3.
2)Feynman gate
It is defined as TFA,B(A,B) = (A,A⊕3B), where ⊕3 stands for addition modulo 3, and
A,B ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
3)Ternary K -Controlled X (TKCX) Gate
For a TKCXi1,i2···,ik;j(B) gate, when Bi1 = Bi2 = · · · = Bik = 2, X(ij) will be acted on
target bit Bj , therein Bi1, Bi2, · · ·, Bik are control bits. When K=1, the TKCX gate will
evolve into the TCX gate.
4)Ternary K -Controlled-NOT (TKCNOT) gate
A TKCNOT gate Ci1,i2,···,ik;j(Al) is defined as follows
• if j 6= l, then Pl = Ci1,i2,···,ik;j(Al) = Al.
• if j = l, and Ai1 = Ai2 = · · · = Aik = 2, then Pj = Aj⊕31; else Pj = Aj .
(2.9)
5)Generalized Controlled X(GCX) Gate
For a GCX(m′) gate and a two-qutrit |m,A〉, When m′ is fixed as a special control bit
and m′ = m, X(ij) will be acted on target bit A; Otherwise GCX(m′) gate will not affect
the state |m,A〉,for m′,m ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
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2.3 TQOTP scheme
By referring to QOTP[22] and combining it with ternary quantum information technology,
we design a TQOTP scheme. Suppose an n-qutrit encryption operator is denoted as
Uk ∈ {XαHβZδ|α, β, δ ∈ {0, 1, 2}n} (2.10)
Where X, H, and Z all represent ternary quantum gates, and Xα = ⊗ni=1Xα(i), Hβ =
⊗ni=1Hβ(i), Zδ = ⊗ni=1Zδ(i). Obviously, we can use 3n random natural numbers and patulous
bit-wise XHZ gates to encrypt an n-qutrit quantum state. The encryption operator Uk
satisfies a uniform distribution of 33n unitary matrices. Thus, the probability pk, which
means the probability of choosing Uk, is defined as pk = 1
/
33n. Actually Uk is a 3
n × 3n
unitary matrix. The encryption procedure is |ψc〉 = Uk |ϕ〉 = XαHβZδ |ϕm〉, and the
decryption procedure is |ψm〉 = U †k |ψc〉 = U †kXαHβZδ |ϕm〉 = ZδHβXαXαHβZδ |ϕm〉 =
|ϕm〉.
Remark 1. With respect to our TQOTP scheme, there are some improvements which
we can do. These improvements include determining how to combine the TQOTP scheme
with quantum key distribution, and construct the encryption operator Uk, and so on. By
improving the TQOTP scheme, we can obtain an information-theoretically-secure scheme.
These interesting problems will be discussed in future work.
2.4 QHE scheme
Definition 2. A QHE scheme is composed of four algorithms[13]: a key generation algo-
rithm, an encryption algorithm, a decryption algorithm and an evaluation algorithm.
Compared with the usual quantum encryption scheme, the QHE scheme has a fourth
evaluation algorithm, which is used to process the quantum ciphertext without decrypting
it. The purpose of the evaluation algorithm is mainly to construct a homomorphic unitary
operation, which can be acted on given quantum ciphertext, according to a given unitary
operation. After a user has decrypted the result of the evaluation algorithm, he will obtain
the same result of the corresponding operation in plaintext. So how to construct a homo-
morphism operation on given quantum ciphertext is the key issue in constructing the QHE
scheme.
Remark 2. Suppose ρc and σm are the forms of density matrices for quantum states. T∆
is a set of permitted quantum operators. The evaluation algorithm can be described as
follows: according to the key and the given operator T ∈ T∆, it generates another quantum
operator T ’ and performs it on the ciphertext ρc. In this case, the operator T ’ is related to
the operator T and the key. The operator T can be regarded as a desired operation on the
plaintext σm. The operation T ’ corresponding to T is performed on the ciphertext ρc, and
can implement the desired operation on the plaintext σm.
3 TQHE scheme
3.1 One-qutrit TQHE scheme
1)One-qutrit rotation gates
For a set of permitted quantum operators
{
R
(ij)
∂ (θ)|∂ ∈ {y, z} , ij ∈ {01, 02}
}
, we only
consider four forms, R
(01)
y (θ), R
(02)
y (θ), R
(01)
z (θ) and R
(02)
z (θ), in the first TQHE scheme.
The evaluation algorithm will construct the corresponding homomorphic operator <(ij)∂ ,
such that
<(ij)∂ XαHβZδ = XαHβZδR(ij)∂ (θ) (3.1)
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It is deduced that <(ij)∂ = XαHβZδR(ij)∂ (θ)ZδHβXα. The first TQHE scheme is shown as
follows.
KeyGenAlgorithm:Randomly generate three key numbers α, β, δ ∈ {0, 1, 2};
EncryptAlgorithm : ρc = X
αHβZδσmZ
δHβXα;
DecryptAlgorithm : σm = Z
δHβXαρcX
αHβZδ;
EvaluateAlgorithm:According to α, β, δ and R
(ij)
∂ (θ), it performs homomorphic oper-
ator <(ij)∂ = XαHβZδR(ij)∂ (θ)ZδHβXα on the given ciphertext ρc without a decryption
process. The output state of EvaluateAlgorithm is
<(ij)∂ ρc(<(ij)∂ )† = XαHβZδ(R(ij)∂ (θ)σm(R(ij)∂ (θ))†)ZδHβXα (3.2)
For Eq.3.2, a brief verification is given as follows,
<(ij)∂ ρc(<(ij)∂ )† = XαHβZδR(ij)∂ (θ)ZδHβXαXαHβZδσmZδHβXα(<(ij)∂ )†
= XαHβZδR
(ij)
∂ (θ)σmZ
δHβXα(<(ij)∂ )†
= XαHβZδR
(ij)
∂ (θ)σmZ
δHβXαXαHβZδ(R
(ij)
∂ (θ))
†ZδHβXα
= XαHβZδ(R
(ij)
∂ (θ)σm(R
(ij)
∂ (θ))
†ZδHβXα
(3.3)
So Eq.3.2 holds. After the user decrypts the state of Eq.3.2, he will obtain the desired-state
as follows
ZδHβXα<(ij)∂ ρc(<(ij)∂ )†XαHβZδ
= ZδHβXαXαHβZδ(R
(ij)
∂ (θ)σm(R
(ij)
∂ (θ))
†)ZδHβXαXαHβZδ
= R
(ij)
∂ (θ)σm(R
(ij)
∂ (θ))
†
(3.4)
Obviously, according to Eq.3.4 the output state of EvaluateAlgorithm is just the result of
the operator R
(ij)
∂ (θ) acting on the plaintext σm after the user decrypts it.
For a instance, suppose the user plaintext state is |0〉 = (1, 0, 0)T , the user-desired
operator on the plaintext is R
(01)
y (pi) =
 0 0 −10 1 0
1 0 0
, and the encryption operator Uk is
X2H0Z1 = 1√
2
 1 −1 00 0 √2
1 1 0
 . Thus the homomorphic operator <(01)y is 12
 1 −
√
2 −1√
2 0
√
2
−1 −√2 1
 .
The output state of EvaluateAlgorithm is Z1H0X2<(01)y X2H0Z1 |0〉 = (0, 0, 1)T = R(01)y (pi) |0〉,
which is exactly the output of the user-desired operator R
(01)
y (pi) acting on the plaintext
|0〉. Moreover, no decryption is performed during the computing of EvaluateAlgorithm.
Thus, the scheme satisfies the definition in section 2.4, and the result of the homomorphism
operator is precisely the user-desired output state.
2)General one-qutrit gates
An arbitrary 3 × 3 unitary matrix U can be decomposed into some R(ij)∂ terms (see
Eq.2.8). Accordance to Eq.3.1, we can obtain the homomorphism operator <(ij)∂ corre-
sponding to R
(ij)
∂ acting on the quantum plaintext state. Thus the homomorphic operator
<U corresponding to the unitary matrix U can synthesized by eight <(ij)∂ . Referring to the
first TQHE scheme, we can propose the second TQHE scheme for an arbitrary 3×3 unitary
matrix U. It can be seen that the operator <U is a little complicated. As a result it will
influence the execution efficiency of EvaluateAlgorithm.
3.2 TQHE scheme for GCX gate
The Cartan Decomposition of one-qutrit gate is not unique, so the choice of one-qutrit
elementary gates is not unique either. Refs.23 and 24 regard GCX gate and extended
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Figure 1: Synthesis of TSUM gate.
Figure 2: Synthesis of TSWAP gate.
rotation gate as a two-qutrit elementary gate, respectively. In this paper, we choose the
GCX gate as a ternary quantum elementary gate, which is universal for n-qutrit quantum
computing, when it is assisted by arbitrary one-qutrit gates. The common two-qutrit gates:
TCX, TSWAP, TSUM (TFeynman), TXOR, and TShift gate can be synthesized by some
GCX gates without auxiliary one-qutrit gates. For example, the TSUM (TFeynman) gate is
synthesized by four GCX gates, as shown in Fig.1. Likewise, the TSWAP gate is synthesized
by nine GCX gates (see Fig.2) and the TXOR gate synthesized by three GCX gates (see
Fig.3).
When the control bit m′ is set to |0〉 state (or |1〉 or |2〉 ) and m′ = m, the effect of the
GCX(m’ ) gate is that the operator X(ij) will be applied to the target bit A. Namely,
GCX(m′) |m,A〉 = (I3 ⊗X(ij)) |m,A〉 = |m〉 ⊗X(ij) |A〉 (3.5)
If m′ 6= m, then the operator X(ij) will be equivalent to I3 without affecting the target
bit A. Therefore the homomorphism operator of the GCX(m’) gate is exactly the similar
with the operators X(ij) ∈ {X(01), X(02), X(12)} (equivalent to X(ij) ∈ {X(0), X(1), X(2)}).
In order to better describe the performance of the GCX(m’) gate acting on the two-qutrit
|m,A〉, the function of f(m′,m) is defined as follows
τ ≡ f(m′,m) ≡
{
I3, m
′ = m
X(ij)
†
,m′ 6= m (3.6)
So the third TQHE scheme associated with the GCX gate is described as follows.
KeyGenAlgorithm:Randomly generate three numbers α, β, δ ∈ {0, 1, 2}2;
EncryptAlgorithm : ρc = X
αHβZδσmZ
δHβXα;
DecryptAlgorithm : σm = Z
δHβXαρcX
αHβZδ;
EvaluateAlgorithm:According to α, β, δ, i and j, it computes the homomorphic operator
X(ij) = X
αHβZδ(I3 ⊗ X(ij)τ)ZδHβXα. Then the corresponding operator X(ij) will be
acted on the given ciphertext ρc without performing DecryptAlgorithm. The output state
of EvaluateAlgorithm is
X(ij)ρcX
†
(ij) = X
αHβZδ((I3 ⊗X(ij)τ)σm(I3 ⊗X(ij)τ)†)ZδHβXα (3.7)
Figure 3: Synthesis of TXOR gate.
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Obviously it is just the same as the operator I3 ⊗X(ij)τ acting on the plaintext σm. The
scheme based on the GCX gate satisfies the QHE scheme demand.
For example, suppose that the user’s plaintext state is |02〉 = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)T .
For the user-desired GCX(m’), the control bit m’ is set to 0 and operator X is speci-
fied as X(02)τ (equivalent to I3 ⊗ X(02), τ = f(m′,m) = I3). The encryption operator
is denoted as ε32×32 = X12H02Z01 = (X1 ⊗ X2)(H0 ⊗ H2)(Z0 ⊗ Z1), that is:ε32×32 =
1
2

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
0 0 0 0 0 0 −√2 √2 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
√
2 −√2 0
0 0 −√2 0 0 −√2 0 0 0
1 −1 0 1 −1 0 0 0 0
−1 −1 0 −1 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 −√2 0 0 √2 0 0 0
1 −1 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0
−1 −1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0

. Thus, the homomorphic oper-
ator X(ij) is I3 ⊗ uτ , where u = 12
 0 −
√
2
√
2
−√2 1 1√
2 1 1
 and τ = I3. The output state is
Z01H02X12X(ij)X
12H02Z01 |02〉 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)T = |00〉 = (I3 ⊗X(02)τ) |02〉 After
a user has decrypted the result of EvaluateAlgorithm, he will obtain the same result as the
user-desired operator X(02)τ acting on the plaintext σm. The scheme is in accord with the
definition in section 2.4.
3.3 n-qutrit TQHE scheme
Any n-qutrit quantum gate can be expressed as a 3n×3n unitary matrix. Based on one/two-
qutrit quantum gates, there are plenty of research opportunities for n-qutrit quantum gates
by using permutation group theory and Cosine-Sine Decomposition (CSD). According to
permutation group theory, all n-qutrit((n ≥ 2)) quantum circuits can be generated by
a group of two-qutrit gates: SWAP, NOT and 1-controlled-NOT gates without ancillary
qutrits[25, 26]. Obviously, it is only a construction-based algorithm. In terms of CSD, a
3n × 3n unitary matrix can be synthesized by 12 controlled-U gates, 12 Dual-Shift gates,
3n (N -1)-controlled rotation gates and 2 · (n− 1) · 3n−1 TX gates[27]. The (N -1)-controlled
rotation gate is defined as follows
(N − 1)CR(A1, · · ·An;B) =
{
(A1, · · ·, An−1;RB), Ai = 2, 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
(A1, · · ·, An−1;B), others (3.8)
For Ai, B ∈ {0, 1, 2}, R ∈
 cos θ − sin θ 0sin θ cos θ 0
0 0 1
 or
 1 0 00 cos θ − sin θ
0 sin θ cos θ
. No matter
which method is used to synthesize a 3n× 3n unitary matrix, there always exists extremely
complex process, a giant number gates and very low efficiency. At present, this is a difficulty
and hot issue of synthesis of multivalue quantum gate.
According to Ref.25 and section 3.2, we describe a process of how to construct an n-
qutrit TQHE scheme. TNOT gate and Ternary 1-controlled gate are in fact two single-shift
gates with conditions (see Table 1). The difference is the latter requires the control bit to
be 2 on base of the formers condition (see Figs.4 and 5). Obviously, a TNOT gate can
be synthesized by two GCX gates (see Fig.4). And a ternary 1-comtrolled gate can be
synthesized by two conditional GCX gates (see Fig.5). Therefore, we can conclude that any
n-qutrit (n ≥ 2) logic circuits can be synthesized by some GCX gates.
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Figure 4: Synthesis of TNOT gate Cj(Am).
Figure 5: Synthesis of Ternary 1-controlled NOT gate Ci1;j(Am).
Suppose the user will perform the quantum circuit C3n×3n on the given quantum plain-
text. In principle we can get the homomorphism operator C
′
3n×3n , which is synthesized by
a large number of GCX gates’ homomorphic operators, such that
C
′
3n×3nX
αHβZδ = XαHβZδC3n×3n (3.9)
Where α, β, δ ∈ {0, 1, 2}n. So far we can present n-qutrit QHE scheme in theory. However,
the form of the operator C3n×3n synthesized by a great deal of GCX gates is so complex that
performing EvaluateAlgorithm is very bad in execution efficiency and energy consumption.
Thus the n-qutrit QHE scheme does need many improvements in multivalue quantum circuit
synthesis and homomorphic EvaluateAlgorithm design.
4 Analysis
4.1 Circuit synthesis
Currently, the synthesis of multivalue quantum logic circuit mainly focuses on the simplest
ternary quantum logic circuits. Although there are some research achievements, they are not
very mature themselves. How to choose universal ternary quantum gate has not been well
solved so far. And there are no uniform criteria for the performance analysis, complexity,
cost, energy consumption, and so on, after the ternary quantum gates being synthesized
by a number of GCX gates. In short, it is feasible to construct an n-qutrit QHE scheme
in theorem, but it is too difficult to construct in practice. Therefore, this paper does not
actually construct such a scheme and we only describe a general construction process by
the synthesis method.
In view of the current state of research on the synthesis of an n-qutrit quantum gate
(actually a 3n × 3n unitary matrix), synthesis methods of quantum circuit require further
optimization and refinement. Based on quantum circuit synthesis, construction of an n-
qutrit QHE scheme is premature. The key reasons are very low performance efficiency and
difficulties in constructing the homomorphic operator while executing EvaluateAlgorithm.
Therefore, the TQHE scheme presented in the paper is limited to one-qutrit rotation gates,
one-qutrit quantum gates and two-qutrit gates synthesized by some GCX gates. Theoreti-
cally, we can generalize the TQHE scheme to the n-qutrit (n ≥ 2) quantum gates case.
4.2 Security
Our TQHE schemes, which are based on the TQOTP scheme, all assume that the delegation
party is honesty. There are two aspects of this representation. One is that it will not leak
9
or snoop users private data in the process of performing EvaluateAlgorithm in the case
of knowing the decryption key. The other is that it will right execute the commissioned
unitary operators without decryption. The delegation party must know the user-given
operators and the secret key. Otherwise he cannot correctly construct the homomorphic
operator. It should be noted that the EvaluateAlgorithm is dependent on the secret key.
Thus, the delegation party can decrypt it and obtain the original qutrit. This will restrict
the application of these schemes. Meanwhile these schemes cannot be used in blind quantum
computation. However, we can delegate the computation to the trusted party by using the
TQHE schemes, which can prevent the malicious parties from obtaining the data and the
result of the computation. Of course, these schemes can be also used in secure multiparty
quantum computation.
In addition to the legal user and trusted delegation party, there is no party (including
the eavesdropper, etc.) that is able to get the complete user data. According to our TQOTP
scheme, which is used to encrypt the users original data, the eavesdropper correctly guesses
the secret key with the probability pk = 1
/
33n. In the case of one-qutrit (n = 1), the
probability pk is 1
/
33n = 1
/
33 = 1/27 ≈ 3.7% . Similarly, in the case of two-qutrit (n = 2),
the probability pk is 1
/
36 ≈ 0.14% and, with three-qutrit (n = 3), the probability pk is
1
/
39 ≈ 5.08 × 10−3%. With the increase of original datas length, the secret keys length
will be longer. So the probability pk will become smaller and smaller, and eventually it will
tend to zero. It is extremely difficult for the eavesdropper to correctly guess the secret key.
Additionally, the quantum key distribution protocols, such as the BB84 protocol, can be
used to generate and transmit the secret key between user and delegation party, which must
make our secret key unconditional secure. As a result, our schemes will be more secure.
The eavesdropper cannot obtain effective and complete information for the user en-
crypted data and the output state of the EvaluateAlgorithm. Suppose forcing to measure
the intercepted data, the eavesdropper will obtain the random information about these
encrypted data. Due to the quantum No-Cloning Theorem and Heisenberg Uncertainty
Principle, along with the TQOTP scheme, the eavesdropper knows nothing about the mu-
tual information of the unknown cipher states, namely I(ρc : Eve) ≈ 0. There is only
one round of information exchange between the user and the delegation party in our TQHE
schemes, rather than several rounds of information exchange in blind quantum computation.
The benefits of our schemes are the high level of users data privacy and the reduction of
the times for which sensitive data is exposed. By performing EvaluateAlgorithm, the dele-
gation party will execute the corresponding homomorphic operator in the user-given cipher
states. The homomorphic operator is equivalent to a new encryption operator, which acts
on the user-given ciphertext. The homomorphic operator is only known by the delegation
party, and the eavesdropper knows nothing about it. Without knowing the secret key and
homomorphic operator, the eavesdropper does not know the secondary encrypted quantum
states, i.e.,I(ρc : Eve) ≈ 0.
The binary QHE schemes presented in Ref.13 are efficient and perfectly secure, i.e.,
I(ρc : σm) = H(ρc) − H(ρc|σm) = 0. It shows that the ciphertext is independent of the
plaintext. However, a deterministic QHFE scheme necessarily incurs exponential overhead
if perfect security is required[28]. This is very difficult to implement in practice. The TQHE
schemes in this paper are not perfectly secure because of the encryption operator Uk, which
is not a complete orthogonal basis in n-qutrit Hilbert Space. As a result, both of the output
quantum states of the EvaluateAlgorithm and EncryptionAlgorithm are not the totally
mixed states. According to definition 1 in Ref.11, our TQHE schemes are all ε-security.
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5 Conclusion
At present, there exist few researches in QHE. According to present research, it is the very
first time to present these TQHE schemes based on TQOTP in this paper. First, we pro-
posed a TQOTP protocol and these TQHE schemes are based on it. Second, in allusion
to the ternary quantum rotation gate R
(ij)
∂ , we had constructed the homomorphic operator
<(ij)∂ and the first TQHE scheme. Then according to general one-qutrit gate synthesized by
eight <(ij)∂ gates, we presented the second TQHE scheme. Third, on the basis of Ref.23 and
the GCX(m’) gate which can be as a two-qutrit universal gate, we constructed the third
TQHE scheme for the GCX(m’) gate. Referring to Refs.25-26 and the third TQHE scheme,
we generalized to n-qutrit case and theoretically presented the fourth TQHE scheme. Fi-
nally, we discussed two components of these schemes security. One is that there exists an
extremely low probability that the attacker correctly guesses the secret key. Another is
that the attacker knows almost nothing about two kinds of cipher quantum states, i.e., the
output encrypted quantum states of the EvaluateAlgorithm and EncryptionAlgorithm.
Meanwhile, future research ideas are to find a TQOTP scheme with perfect security and
to construct an asymmetric TQHE scheme, where the EvaluateAlgorithm only depends
on the public key but not the private key. The latter is an open problem. Maybe one can
consider how to modify the quantum public-key encryption scheme in Refs.29-30, such that
it becomes an asymmetric QHE scheme. If this goal were achieved, the computing on the
quantum cipher state could be securely outsourced, and then blind quantum computation
would be implemented in this way.
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